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Abstract
Until recently, Internet governance was a relatively obscure topic in most technology policy agendas in Latin America. But
in mid-2013, revelations about widespread surveillance of Internet communications dramatically transformed conversations
about the issue. The work addresses the institutional consolidation of emerging experiences in national contexts to address
Internet governance and policy as well as their effectiveness in shaping regional and global processes. This paper takes a
comparative approach, by looking at several national cases; the experience of Argentine Commission for Internet Policy
(CAPI) created in 2014; Costa Rica with the Internet Consulting Committee (in 2012) and Mexico with the Initiative Group
(2012). These cases were examined against the backdrop of the well documented Brazilian experience and its Internet
Steering Committee (CGI)( 2005). The research analysed the national Internet governance mechanisms in the early stages of
the institutionalization process, looking at the main developments that have shaped actors’ strategies as well as the evolution
of Internet regulations in these countries. The three cases differ in both the degree of formality, working mechanisms and
stakeholder representation in these new bodies. In each national context, it is clear that governments are now working to
formalize policymaking arrangements, as the original informal coordination mechanisms that gave rise to the Internet in
these countries are no longer sufficient. The bridges between the international and the domestic field will tend to rely on
more formally institutionalized spaces as states become more involved with the issue.

The Centro de Tecnología y Sociedad’s (CETYS) at the Universidad de San Andrés serves as an academic interdisciplinary
space for the study of issues related with the management, regulation, development and impact of ICTs in society. It has three
lines of work: e-government, Internet governance and Policies and Impact of ICT.
The Internet Policy Observatory (IPO) is a program tasked with researching the dynamic technological and political
contexts in which internet governance debates take place and serves as a platform for informing relevant communities of
activists, academics, and policy makers, showcasing data and analysis. The Observatory encourages and sponsors research
and studies ongoing events and key decisions on Internet policy.To learn more about the project or to inquire about research
collaborations with the IPO, please visit globalnetpolicy.org or email internetpolicy@asc.upenn.edu.
The Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) is a leader in international education and training in comparative
media law and policy. It affords students, academics, lawyers, regulators, civil society representatives and others the
opportunity to evaluate and discuss international communications issues. Working with the Annenberg School, the
University of Pennsylvania, and research centers, scholars and practitioners from around the world, CGCS provides research
opportunities for graduate students; organizes conferences and trainings; and provides consulting and advisory assistance
to academic centers, governments, and NGOs.
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1. Introduction
Until recently, Internet governance was a relatively obscure topic in most technology policy agendas in Latin
America. Debates were limited to specialized government
agencies, a few academics, and a handful of NGOs. In mid2013, revelations about widespread surveillance of Internet communications dramatically transformed conversations about the politics of internet policymaking. Today
Internet governance issues are discussed at the highest
policy levels and are prominently covered by the mainstream media, while key events such as NETmundial (April
2014) are attended by high-level representatives from
across the region.
The rapid rise of Internet governance in the policy agendas of Latin American countries raises several questions.
What are the institutional building blocks for policy formation and implementation? Which stakeholders are being
represented and how? To what extent are institutional
models from other countries being replicated? How are
these domestic debates articulating within global Internet
policy discussions and institutions (IGF, WSIS, ITU, ICANN,
and so on)? Are there mechanisms for policy coordination
within the region? Have these mechanisms been effective? How can they be improved in order to strengthen
Latin American voices in global debates?
This paper addresses these questions by examining Internet policy formation in three national case studies: Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico. We had to work around
the selection of case studies so that they respond to both
empirical and theoretical concerns, with a “causes-ofeffects approach” in order to enquire into the specificity
of these arrangements and their processes. Argentina is
a regional leader in Internet infrastructure development
and adoption, and yet its presence in global Internet de-
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bates has so far not corresponded with the national patterns of adoption and indicators. The case of Mexico – the
second largest economy and market in Latin America – is
somewhat similar, although its initiative comes as part of a
much larger reform package that seeks to unlock competition and diversity in its telecommunications and media
industries, while at the same time it is addressing specific
Internet governance issues with the initiative “Diálogos de
Gobernanza de Internet.” Costa Rica adds the perspective
of a small country which nonetheless is considered a regional leader in several Internet-related initiatives (e.g., IT
education and training), as well as being one of the most
politically defined countries in the region with respect
to multi-stakeholder governance. These cases are all examined against the backdrop of the “CGI” (the Brazilian
Internet Steering Committee), one of the most successful
experiences of a formal, national multi-stakeholder mechanism around Internet governance and its critical Internet
resources that has been in place since 1995.
The paper is structured in three sections. The first lays
out the conceptual framework that orients the comparative case study analysis. It identifies three interrelated
dimensions of Internet governance: the technical, the institutional, and the systemic. These dimensions help to determine common patterns and differences in Internet policy-making in the national cases under study. The second
section discusses the national case studies selected (Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico) against the backdrop of
the Brazilian experience. An examination of their various
approaches, from the early years of the Internet and the
emergence of the first stakeholders to the present, serves
to map the different choices and national trajectories. The
third section synthesizes the findings of the comparative
analysis in light of the questions posed above.
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2. Conceptual Framework
Identifying the technical, institutional, and systemic dimensions of the various governance approaches provides
an organizing framework for the different issues that are at
stake in Internet governance. We have drawn these dimensions from the literature on public policy (Knill and Tosun,
2008; Stein and Tommasi, 2006) and governance studies
(Kooiman 2002; Rhodes 1996; Stoker, 1998) to conduct a
multi-layered analysis of Internet governance approaches
at the national level. Authors in these fields have defined
the technical dimension of governance as “how things are
done” at the operational level (Abbott and Snidal, 2008),
first level of governance (Kooiman, 2002), or have designated it as operational governance (Hupe and Hill, 2006).
This is the realm of critical Internet resources involving the
“logical layer” (Lessig, 2000). Since the Internet is a technology made of “code,” which refers to the nature of TCP/
IP (Solum, 2008), the technical dimension bridges the infrastructure (hardware, connectivity) and content layers
of the Internet.1 Our analysis focuses on critical Internet
resources involving two basic Internet protocols, the DNS
and TCP/IP, since both are borderless technologies, and
hence national stakeholders involved in their management must necessarily interact with international institutions and regime-like processes. Yet due to the features of
Internet architecture, it will be difficult to outline many of
the national players’ strategies without occasionally addressing connectivity, infrastructure, and other regulatory
issues.
Institutional governance has been defined as the structural settings that frame interactions among actors. This
is the level of institutions (Kooiman, 2002), inter-organizational relations (Stoker, 1998), representational governance
(Abbott and Snidal, 2008), or directive governance (Hupe
and Hill, 2006). In the case of Internet governance, examining the institutional dimension means looking at both
the mechanisms and outcomes of the institutionalization
process, and the multi-stakeholder, multi-issue, multi-level
nature of governance processes. The existence of national
focal points for debate and coordination is a feature of this
dimension. Some of the approaches proposed since the
origins of the WSIS process are oriented toward building
national Internet governance capacities and include the
1

There is no single accepted definition of Critical Internet Resources, for the
term is also connected to a political dimension of Internet Governance (CDT,
2007). Still, most definitions include the following: root servers, Internet backbone structures, IP addresses, DNS management and coordination, protocols,
and standards (based on Council of Europe, 2009 and Center for Democracy
and Technology, 2007).

role of ccTLDs as coordination hubs for national Internet
policies, building on the model of the Brazilian Internet
Steering Committee (Siganga, 2005).
Systemic governance is associated with the concepts of
meta-governance (Peters, 2010; Kooiman, 2002), systemic
coordination (Stoker, 1998), and constitutive governance
(Hupe and Hill, 2006). These share a common feature. They
refer not just to who has power or how something is governed, but also to the (re)examination of the rules of the
game. This is the most abstract dimension of the framework, and in the case of Internet governance it centers on
the interactions between the national and international
spheres. Due to the global nature of the technology, international developments are particularly influential on
the domestic space. We can operationalize systemic governance by examining the levels of engagement of diverse
national stakeholders in regional and global forums in
their attempts to revise the institutional rules of the game,
– whether they are aligned with or opposed to the regime
but also whether they are seeking, for regime changes
“from within” by promoting new institutional venues or
a reformulation of existing institutional structures. Until
now, the strategy of attempting to promote changes to
the regime from within have proved to be more successful
than those attempts to dismantle it from outside, as exemplified by the WCIT process discussed later in this paper.
In sum, when Internet governance focuses on technical
issues, it addresses operational dimensions of governance.
When it is oriented toward policies that promote the development of institutions and actors, it touches upon a more
complex level where a greater number of competencies
are needed - such as independence, representativeness,
and experience, rather than just operational skills (Abbott
and Snydal, 2008). The third level of governance, in turn,
involves systemic approaches to reshaping the global
regime and the harmonization of several competencies
based on the institutional and technical dimensions.
These levels are interdependent; operational excellence
is difficult to achieve without the right institutional conditions. Yet to participate more meaningfully and influence
the international Internet governance regime, national
stakeholders need to go beyond addressing the technical–operational level of governance, which has been the
predominant strategy. They must develop the institutional
dimension through national multi-stakeholder coordinaPage 5

INTERNET POLICY FORMATION IN LATIN AMERICA: UNDERSTANDING THE LINKS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL, THE REGIONAL, AND THE GLOBAL

tion processes. As the case of Brazil shows, the consolidation of this dimension has enabled the country to address
systemic governance at a global level more effectively.
Although NETmundial represented a turning point in
the debate about Internet governance in Latin America,
policy-making efforts in the region can be traced back to
the WSIS process, which led to the approval of the Tunis
Agenda in 2005 (Lucero, 2011). Until then, Internet governance discussions had been a by-product of two related
processes. The first one was the struggle undertaken by Internet pioneers in each country to overcome the technical
and regulatory challenges involved in connecting to the
early Internet. These were ad-hoc attempts by early enthusiasts (most of them academics) that progressed in parallel to the evolution of the Internet itself. On the technical
side, their primary concern was the management of critical Internet resources, including ccTLDs. On the regulatory
side, the key challenge was obtaining cooperation from
national incumbents exercising monopoly control over international gateways. This undertaking was closely related
to the restructuring of the telecommunications sector during the 1990s. These sector reforms, aimed at opening the
market and (in most countries) privatizing state operators,
created a more fertile environment for the adoption of
technological innovations such as the Internet.
This paper is part of a broader research effort to reconceptualize the role of domestic factors and national institutional arrangements in Internet governance, with a particular focus on nations that did not take part in the early
networking initiatives from which the current Internet
emerged.2 Until recently, Internet governance was conceptualized almost exclusively from a global regime perspective. In other words, it was viewed as a problem of balancing the competing preferences and interests of all the
nations involved, which are incapable of exercising control
over the Internet individually. Up until the WSIS process, a
narrow approach to Internet governance prevailed, which
centered on its technical aspects and the perspective of
the developed nations that had participated in the early
Internet (Drake, 2004). Such an approach marginalized developing countries, since by and large they did not take
part in the technological developments that coalesced in
the Internet. The establishment of ICANN compounded
this difficulty by establishing a California-based, non-profit
2

Other examples are Aguerre (2015). La gobernanza de Internet. Argentina y
Brasil en el contexto global. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Universidad
de Buenos Aires, Argentina; Lucero, Everton (2011) Governança da internet :
aspectos da formação de um regime global e oportunidades para a ação
diplomática. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.
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organization, under contract with the U.S. Department of
Commerce, to supervise the IANA functions.
The WSIS process (2003-2005) openly questioned the
institutional legitimacy of these early governance arrangements. Furthermore, it emphasized the political implications of the decisions being made through ICANN and
other technical forums. As long as Internet governance
was framed as a technical problem, developing countries would continue to play a largely passive role in the
decision-making process, since the technology and its basic design principles had already been established. WSIS
brought to the forefront debates about institutional design
and the roles assigned to different stakeholders in Internet
governance, including the recognition of multi-stakeholder governance as a key underlying principle for all related
processes. Using Jupille and Snidal’s (2005) characterization of the institutional options in international regimes
(2005), WSIS opened the door for debates about institutional use, selection, reformulation, and change in existing
arrangements. One of the most prominent outcomes of
the WSIS process was the creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), framed as a space for discussion and
agenda-setting of different stakeholders and enshrining
the principles of multi-stakeholder governance, based on
the equal input from different sectors.
Since then, developing countries have attempted to assert their right to participate in these debates through different strategies. One of these has been an effort to shift the
discussion to international organizations within the scope
of the UN, where they perceive to be better represented.
In particular, the longstanding tradition of the ITU in international communications was perceived as a legitimate
forum for Internet policy-making by many governments
in emerging countries. These multilateral mechanisms are
better understood by many of these national delegations
with a bureaucratic culture that is well versed with these
processes and the one State - one vote system, which differs from the consensual approach employed by several
of the technical organizations of the Internet. Multilateralism is perceived as a much more legitimate venue to address global public policy issues surrounding the Internet
by many developing countries. But there has been strong
resistance to what is perceived as a top-down, closed environment from most developed countries. This divide was
seen most recently during the rather tense negotiations
over the adoption of new International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) at the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), organized by the ITU in
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Dubai in 2012.3 This was the second treaty-like meeting of
the ITU to reform the ITRs after 24 years since the previous
WCIT (held in Melbourne in 1988) when the Internet was
barely emerging and thus was not even considered. The
huge changes in the telecommunications scenario since
Melbourne—including mobile communications and the
phenomenon of convergence and the widespread adoption of the Internet—were among other key elements to
be discussed as part of the new global regulations under
the ITU. It provided a testing arena for the strength of
these different approaches on the issue of Internet governance. According to Klimburg, after the WCIT in Dubai in
2012 “only a binary world seemed to be left – most of the
developing world (minus India) had sided with the cyber
sovereignty advocates. WCIT had morphed into a battle
that, effectively, resulted in the West against the rest”
(Klimburg, 2013, p. 3).
This polarization, and the interpretations that followed
the conference, have obscured the nuances in the perspectives of developing countries adopting the new ITRs.
In particular, while countries with a poor democratic record tended to favour the new ITRs adopted at the WCIT,
this perspective does not explain the positions adopted by
different Latin American countries. Many of those adopting the ITRs were countries that have consistently supported the multi-stakeholder model. They perceived the ITRs
not as a strategy to destabilize the existing Internet governance ecosystem, but rather as a mechanism to broaden
participation by developing nations within an institutional
context (the UN system) whose rules are well-known to
Latin American governments. In other words, support
for the ITRs was a confidence vote in the multilateral approach that the region has long favoured to resolve other
complex global issues.
In addition to global debates, several regional governance mechanisms introduced and developed by the OAS
and ECLAC (the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean) have allowed for regional policy coordination and coalition building in Latin America. The
OAS has been active in the last five years in cybersecurity

issues,4 while ECLAC has implemented the eLAC strategy.5
Run and coordinated by governments, eLAC is viewed
as a multi-stakeholder space for policy coordination and
input on several ICT and Internet-related initiatives at
a regional level. During the third stage of its action plan
(2010-2015) eLAC established a Working Group on Internet Governance, reflecting the prominence that the issue
has acquired in the broader Information Society discussions. This group has become more deeply involved in the
regional Internet Governance Forum, called LACIGF, which
has been functioning continuously since 2008, originally
driven by the technical community and civil society organizations. The eLAC ministerial declaration of April 2013
exemplifies regional coordination to achieve a common
position in view of ICANN’s new gTLD program and the
controversies around geographical Top Level Domains
which affected the region6. It also served to ratify the need
to address multi-stakeholder dialogues, since it highlighted the need to increase cooperation with non-governmental stakeholders to increase governmental awareness
and engagement in forums such as ICANN.
At the national level, until recently there were few countries that had established national mechanisms for Internet
policy-making. In Latin America, topics such as Internet for
development and the human rights dimension of Internet
governance emerged prominently at the Bávaro Meeting in 2003, which kick-started contributions from LAC
governments to the WSIS process. In addition, the WSIS
process facilitated debate and reflection on the current
international regime and the way it had been structured
until then, particularly concerning the IANA functions and
ICANN’s contract with the U.S. government. During the
WSIS process, opposition to this model was very clear in
the case of Brazil, (Lucero, 2011).7 Nonetheless, this critical
4
5

6

3

The struggle over the meaning and implementation of multi-stakeholder
Internet governance was not only present at WCIT-12. The United Nations
Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) convened a
working group between 2013 and 2014 to examine the mandate of the Tunis
Agenda with respect to “enhanced cooperation” (a key component of the
multi-stakeholder governance process incorporating in particular the role of
multilateral mechanisms) and one of the exercises was to map the weaknesses
and deficits of the regime in addressing global Internet public policy issues.

7

The Cyber Security Program is under the aegis of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE-OAS). See http://www.oas.org/en/sms/cicte/
programs_cyber.asp
eLAC is an intergovernmental strategy that conceives of ICTs as instruments
for economic development and social inclusion in the region. Its first action
plan was implemented in 2007, and one of its main purposes is to fulfill the
Millennium Development Goals related to ICTs before the WSIS review in
2015.
Notably the Latin American region was affected by the ICANN new gTLD
program with the request from two U.S. based companies, Amazon and
Patagonia for their respective new Top Level Domains launched in 2012.
The case of .amazon and .patagonia served to trigger national and regional
mechanisms within the region, at multilateral meetings and though less formal mechanisms, including social network campaigns, to resist to these new
requests.
Brazil was an active opponent to the US Government unilateral control over
the IANA contract functions during the WSIS process and was one of the leaders of the coalition called the “Like-Minded Group”. It was a set of countries
(including China, India, and Iran) that opposed the institutional foundations
of the international regime of Internet governance and aimed to establish an
Intergovernmental Council for Global Public Policy and Oversight. Because
these nations do not have a clear record regarding democratic performance
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stance had no adherents in the region at the time of the
Tunis Declaration; the other LAC countries were focusing
on developmental issues associated with the Internet and
ICTs.
In sum, by the time of the Snowden revelations in 2013
interest in Internet policymaking in Latin America had
been gradually building, with greater participation in Internet governance issues and forums, both at the regional
and global levels. The institutional mechanisms were
nonetheless underdeveloped, and participation was erratic and highly dependent on entrepreneurs within national
bureaucracies. Moreover, the lack of consensus-building
mechanisms at the national level resulted in conflicting
positions amongst different national stakeholders, and
even different government agencies. Building these mechanisms continues to be a challenge that countries will
undertake in the post-Snowden context.
and human rights, Brazil’s alliance with them found neither domestic nor
regional supporters.
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3. Internet Governance in Latin America: Case Studies
Argentina
Like most countries in Europe and Latin America, Argentina developed its first data networking initiatives in
research and academic centers. What differed from other
countries was the role of the state and the support that
was provided by government agencies; both during and
after the 1976-1983 dictatorship, research agencies and
university departments were severely under-resourced in
both financial and human capital in these topics8. For this
reason, the partnership between research centers and national government departments and agencies, and sometimes businesses,9 was critical for networking activities.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MREC) adopted the first
international connection in 1987 through a UUCP network
and a partnership with the University of Toronto. That
same year the ministry submitted a request to Jon Postel
for the delegation of the .ar national domain name. Three
years later, Argentina established its first Internet connection with the U.S. by way of the ARNET network at the
MREC. This was a joint project with the Secretariat for Science and Technology (SECYT), headed by Dr. Manuel Sadosky.10
In terms of Internet protocol adoption, by 1991 Argentina was connected to all the usual worldwide networks
(the Internet, BITNET, UUCP, Usenet11), but its expansion
rate was still low (Quaterman, 1991). Network links and
connectivity posed a problem, but network culture was
buoyant, involving more users with different needs. Although the national monopoly of ENTEL, the state-owned
telecommunications company and incumbent operator,
8

This was not the case for all the scientific sectors. Nuclear research for example
was clearly favoured. (Adler, 1987; Albornoz and Gordon, 2011).
9 The company Fate Electrónica, developer of the globally known scientific
calculator Cifra, and large banks and laboratories became a relevant testing
ground for these early networking initiatives by young researchers.
10 Dr. Sadosky, creator of the university degree in computer science at UBA and
one of the leading figures in the dissemination of computer science in Latin
America since the 1960’s.
11 BITNET, “Because It’s There Network,” was developed in 1981 as a cooperative
project between scientists in two universities (CUNY and Yale). Like Usenet,
it employed a point-to-point storage network design and used telephone
lines to run. IBM adopted BITNET for its in-house system, and later the smaller
VAX computers incorporated it as well. Usenet was a distributed system that
resembled Bulletin Board Systems (BBS). Both were precursors of present-day
Internet forums. UUCP is the acronym for Unix-to-Unix Copy. It is a set of computer programs and protocols that allows remote execution of commands
and transfer of files and emails between computers, among others. It was
originally developed for the Unix operating system in the 1970s, but was later
adapted to other operating systems, including Windows and Mac.

ended in 1990, the international link would continue to
be a private-sector monopoly in the hands of Telintar well
into the late 1990s.12 Telintar’s pricing model was based
on circuit-switched rather than packet-switched networks,
a legacy of the OSI model, and hence it charged for data
and amount of time used. Although these issues did not
hamper the entrepreneurial spirit of early pioneers, they
affected the quality and speed of the Internet.
Until 1997, the cost of international connectivity was
prohibitive for a large proportion of nascent ISPs as well as
for non-commercial and academic networks.13 This barrier
led to reform, stimulated by the case of an academic network “Retina” which was the first to be granted an exemption from the monopoly of Telintar in 1994. But Internet
access and affordability were lagging behind due to the
pricing system and monopoly of the international gateway. In 1997, Internet access was declared of “national interest” which as a consequence triggered in the next year
two public consultations which showed how the bottleneck in the international gateway was effectively acting as
barrier to quality and affordable Internet connectivity14.
The pioneers’ struggles for connectivity were extremely
influential in the configuration of differing interests, positions, and strategies at the infrastructure level between
1995 and 2000, when international Internet connectivity was finally liberalized. CABASE (Argentine Chamber of
Online Services and Databases), established in 1989 was
a strong actor in the development of the Argentine Internet. It was the product of an institutional effort by early
Internet entrepreneurs to improve collective action, an
effort that had lasting effects. Its founders have been active participants in national, regional, and global discussions and initiatives associated with Internet infrastructure
and critical resources. In 1997 they founded the first IXP in
Latin America, the “NAP CABASE,” with the aim of lowering the cost of Internet access by localizing national and
regional traffic. To date, this initiative has installed 9 IXPs in
the country and has played a prominent role in the region
12 Telefónica (Spain) and Telecom (France) were awarded the fixed-line telephony market, and Telintar, a company owned in equal parts by these two,
was granted the monopoly of international telecommunications services,
including “value-added services,” which, although still unregulated at the time,
encompassed data communications.
13 Considering the ratio and fee, in 1997 the cost of an international exchange
link with the same quality as U.S. domestic links was one hundred times
higher in certain provinces. Source: CNC Resolution 2765/97.
14 Executive Order 554/97.
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regarding the promotion of Internet Exchange Points to
improve Internet access and technical efficiency.
The current president of the Argentine organization is
also the leader of the International Federation of Regional
IXP Associations, which illustrates the organization’s involvement in the international regime.15 In addition, CABASE was a key regional player during the International
Forum for the White Paper (IFWP) and was the organizer
of the third international meeting that led to the creation
of ICANN in 1998. It was also a founding member of the
Regional Internet Registry, LACNIC, and the local partner
for the organization of the 22 ICANN meeting in Mar del
Plata in 2005, further evidence of the private sector’s interest in international governance arrangements. CABASE
has been one of the few national stakeholders that have
consistently addressed the technical, institutional, and
systemic aspects of Internet governance at the national,
regional, and global levels.
CABASE, as a private-sector representative espousing
the values of the “technical community,” represented by
international Internet organizations such as ISOC, ICANN,
and LACNIC, has remained involved with the development
of the Internet and its infrastructure. In 2005, the major
ISPs – a venture of Telefonica, Telecom, and the other
large telecom players – left the association due to several
conflicting interests, particularly the issue of interconnection of networks which was a major principle for the membership of CABASE to expand connectivity and cut-down
costs. This divide stressed profound differences based on
diverging business models and market orientations: while
the big players are carriers or wholesale providers, most
CABASE members are retail ISPs – largely in the provinces
and in cities in the outskirts of Buenos Aires. This business
model of the carriers and wholesale providers was based
on their ownership of their infrastructure at a large, sometimes national scale, while the smaller providers relied on
this infrastructure and were generating increasing traffic
volumes, particularly since the uptake of VOIP services.
The interconnection of the smaller local networks with the
larger national ones was championed by the retailers and
was seen by the larger players as a threat, which also saw
this initiative as a free-riding exercise since they claimed
that the larger portion of the investments and the risk was
not undertaken by the smaller ventures.

15 The Internet eXchange Federation, created in 2012.
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While in the 1990s CABASE and the communications
regulators (SECOM and CNC) had played a pivotal role in
Internet policy-making,16 it was not until the WSIS process that government actors showed a more proactive
approach to the international Internet policy regime. The
Internet policy agenda focused on the developmental aspects of the Internet and ICTs, including poverty and the
socioeconomic gap, rather than on political aspects of the
global regime, and was taken on by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MREC) and the National Information Technologies
Office (ONTI). Still, despite Argentina’s large delegation to
WSIS and its relatively high profile, this meeting had few
significant effects on domestic Internet policy mechanisms. The various stakeholders involved in the diverse
layers of Internet policy still based their actions on informal coordination mechanisms sustained by years of working together.
Since 2011, changes have occurred that have stemmed
from a particular view on the role of the state in most fields
of policy, especially in those areas where public goods and
services are involved, where the state is not only intervening through regulation but also by becoming a service
provider in this particular sector of telecommunications
and the Internet.
One significant step in this direction was the changes
introduced to the ccTLD.ar (nic.ar) after an executive order17 in December 2011, which re-classified the registry to
the rank of an administration. The trajectory of .ar changed
significantly considering that since its delegation by the
IANA in 1987 it had remained in the margins of national
and international Internet policy discussions, as an insignificant area dependent on the IT department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and lagged behind international best
practices and standards in registry management. After this
regulatory initiative, the ccTLD has not only an enhanced
administrative status, but it has achieved greater autonomy to develop not only technical functions, but to become
a player in its own right in Internet policy related with DNS
issues18.

16 In 1996 SECOM established an Internet Commission. Although there were
few substantial outcomes in practical terms (other than public hearings on
Internet matters in 1997 and 1998), the commission served to outline responsibilities over this issue within the national government.
17 Executive Order 187/2011.
18 Since this measure, several technical and policy measures have been adopted:
from IPv6 implementation, automated registration and registration fees to
name but a few which have served to make it less vulnerable to cyberattacks
and cybersquatting. It has achieved a broader international recognition by
being the local host of ICANN meeting 48 and forthcoming ICANN 53.
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Three additional examples illustrate the government’s
increasing participation in Internet policy. One is the development of the national broadband plan “Plan Argentina Conectada” in 2010,19 which constituted a clear statement in favour of national infrastructure investments for
the development of the domestic Internet backbone. Another example is the bolstering of ARSAT, a national company created in 200620 to develop satellite communication
services in the country. With digitalization of the spectrum
and the development of the “Plan Argentina Conectada,”
ARSAT began to position itself as a telecommunications
service provider, both nationally and regionally and is one
of the players that has most clearly benefited from the latest regulatory change, “Ley Argentina Digital” which will
be next addressed as a final example of this trend.
The bill “Argentina Digital,”21 passed on December 19,
2014, constitutes the most recent milestone in telecommunications, ICT, and Internet policy in this country, since
it addresses the scenario of convergence in communications. This law aims at providing a regulatory framework
for telecommunications in an era of convergence. While
an update of the legislation was perceived as necessary,
the lack of time for public consultation and its approval by
Congress in two months since it first appeared provided
little room for debate with other stakeholders traditionally
involved with Internet policy, which marks a style of governing which contrasts with other governance processes
for Internet-related matters, as well as with the open and
bottom-up consultation process carried out for the “Ley de
Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual”22 (Law for Audiovisual Communication Services) in Argentina. Two issues
derived from the law “Argentina Digital” are particularly
relevant to this study. The first is the lack of a clear description of the power and attributes of the regulatory body,
including issues of organizational and political autonomy,
composition and scope of the functions. The second is the
vagueness of the definition of “ICT services” and “ICT.”23
This ambiguity implies that Internet services might be sub19 Executive Order 1552/2010.
20 Law 26.092 contains the description, mission and objectives of ARSAT created
in 2006.
21 Law 27.078 also known as “Ley de Medios” (Media Law) was passed in 2009
as one of the most categorical reforms during the first presidency period of
Cristina Fernández.
22 Law 26.522 Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual addresses, among others,
the issues of convergence in the broadcasting sector. It has created a new set
of regulations for broadcasting licences in the new digital scenario.
23 Law 27.078 defines ICT Services as follows: “those services whose goal is to
transport and distribute signals or data, such as voice, text, video and images
facilitated or requested by third party users through telecommunication
networks. Each service will be subject to its specific regulatory framework.”
The definition provided for ICT is the following: “it is the set of resources, tools,
equipment, computer programs, applications, networks, and media that allow
the compilation, processing, storage, and transmission of information such as
voice, data, text, video, and images.” (Authors’ translation)

ject to further regulation, including the potential for content layer applications to require a license. The full impact
of this law on the Internet is yet to be assessed since its
application mechanisms are currently being drafted, but
the trend of increased state involvement in Internet policy
at the infrastructure and logical layers is manifest.
On April 22, 2014, one day before NETmundial, SECOM
created the Argentine Commission for Internet Policy
(CAPI) through Resolution 13/2014. When the Brazilian
government invited the Argentine authorities, they were
faced with a dilemma. They had to appoint three government representatives as part of their delegation, but
several government offices were already participating in
international forums (ICANN, CITEL, ITU, eLAC, and so on).
Consequently, SECOM established CAPI as a formal space
for intra-governmental coordination. The Commission
articulates the work of eight agencies that are involved
with the different layers of domestic Internet policy. CAPI
received a twofold mandate: (i) to enhance national information sharing and coordination among the different
government entities involved in Internet policy and governance; and (ii) to consolidate Argentina’s different positions on these issues in international forums.
Although the head of SECOM and the resolution creating CAPI expressly stated the intention to incorporate
multi-stakeholder perspectives into the policy-making
process, up until now the Commission has only served
as a government instrument for debate and information
sharing. At the end of May 2014, it held its first meeting
with non-government actors from civil society, academia,
the business sector, and the technical community that had
participated in NETmundial. The purpose of this meeting
was to listen to the expectations, questions, and concerns
raised by these actors. Since then there have been no additional formal meetings with non-governmental stakeholders, and CAPI is now working with the government agencies named in Resolution 13/2014. According to SECOM,
the conveners of the initiative, before opening the space
to non-governmental stakeholders CAPI must define its
agenda and “generate the proper mechanisms and safeguards to ensure that non-governmental stakeholders are
legitimate representatives of their communities.”24 This
statement relates to a concern present in the governance
literature regarding the “shadows”25 (Peters, 2010) cast
24 Eugenia Migliori, SECOM, LACIGF El Salvador, July 2014.
25 Guy Peters (2010) has identified four governance mechanisms and the “shadows” cast by the authority behind each of them: “hierarchies” correspond to
the bureaucratic state apparatus; in “markets,” power is concentrated in large
corporations or in forces that can produce undesired outcomes, such as drug
trafficking; “society” refers to the social networks of actors in organized civil
society; and a fourth category is associated with the knowledge of experts. In
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by the stakeholders of the four main governance mechanisms (government, businesses, civil society, and the expert community) and the interests they claim to represent.
Until the resolutions contained in the “Argentina Digital” bill were released, various stakeholders expected CAPI
to become an open, diverse body rather than a coordination instrument for the government. Such expectations
stemmed from the influence that the Brazilian multi-stakeholder Internet Steering Committee (CGI) had traditionally exercised as a reference model, both within the government and among other actors. This is not to say that
the CGI is perceived in all of its positions (organizational
design, electoral mechanisms, scope and functions) as a
model to replicate entirely, but it is considered a legitimate
and formal body to address multi-stakeholder representation of Internet governance issues, both nationally and externally. The CGI has set a standard whereby formal internal coordination is seen as necessary but not a sufficiently
legitimate or relevant function on its own for the larger
Internet community. In addition, as many participants in
the first open meeting reported, CAPI had the potential to
become a suitable space for exchange and debate at the
governmental level that would facilitate not just the consolidation of a national position in the face of international
meetings, but also for the debate of domestic issues.
However, up until now this role has not yet been fulfilled.
The Commission did not provide institutional input, either
formally or informally, to the formulation of, and debate
on, the Net Neutrality or the “Argentina Digital” bill. Contrary to the expectations surrounding the creation of this
agency based on its principles and core objectives, which
were discursively aligned with an open, multi-stakeholder
Internet governance framework, its lack of visibility in recent crucial domestic debates have reduced its relevance.
This development leaves Internet policy devoid of a vital
body for institutional and systemic governance.
Costa Rica
Costa Rica has a rich history of networking initiatives
and was the first country in Central America to connect to
the Internet in 1993. As early as 1990, it was already linked
to BITNET, following Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.
the author’s own words, “the logic of these shadows is that these represent
alternative formats for governing, and also represent choices to be made by
the actors involved. They also represent the options available in a complex
political game. Further, few if any of these options will be implemented in
a pure manner. This is especially true now given the complexity of modern
governance, the legitimacy of both market and social actors, and the failure,
or unwillingness, of many governments to supply conventional hierarchical
governance in many settings” (Peters, 2010: 7).
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These early networking experiences were the result of
the endeavours of scientists26 and of two organizations
involved in communications and telecommunications
infrastructure development – RACSA (Costa Rican Radiographic Company) and ICE (Costa Rican Electronic Institute). Institutionally, these efforts started at the University
of Costa Rica, which was involved with other Central American universities in a regional project to develop network
infrastructure (Siles González, 2008). Additionally, Costa
Rica was the first country in the region to deploy an IP
backbone in 1993.
This Central American nation was among the few Latin
American countries in which the telecommunications system remained state-owned until 2008 (ICE). Combined
with progress made in computer science research and
in the university system, public ownership enabled the
government to work on the different layers of technology
and infrastructure needed to develop the Internet, “which
would later allow them to be more independent from international consortiums” (Teramond, 2008). The national
communities forging these connections were based on
international borderless technology (TCP/IP), which relied
heavily on telecommunication networks. In the case of
Costa Rica, for the first fifteen years of Internet adoption,
the infrastructure level was dominated by a strong public-sector player that would leave traces in future policymaking despite market liberalization, as will be described
shortly below.
The connection to the international networks was an accomplishment of the ccTLD .cr, which was created in 1990
and in 1995 was included as part of a wider effort by the
national scientific and engineering community into the
National Academy of Sciences. The latter currently hosts
scientific network projects and other academic cooperative ventures, a corporate umbrella partially supported by
.cr’s registry activities. The consolidation of such an institutional structure has provided this agency with the potential for becoming a focal point for national Internet policymaking, as the work will later develop.
The deployment of commercial Internet services, in turn,
began in 1994 through RACSA, a subsidiary company of
ICE. In addition, a project to develop broadband connectivity was implemented through the Advanced Network
(known as RIA), and ended in 2005. Ties were henceforth
closed between the scientific and technical communities,
26

Notably, Guy de Teramond, who is both a national figure and one of Central
America’s “fathers of the Internet” http://www.odi.ucr.ac.cr/boletin/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=575
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on the one hand, and the government-run telecommunications networks, on the other.
With respect to regulation, the Regulatory Authority for
Public Utilities (ARESEP) underwent changes in 1996 but
continued operating until 2008. That same year the government liberalized the market for the provision of communications services, including Internet and mobility (Law
8642), and created a new, specialized communications
regulatory authority, SUTEL. Along with the opening of the
market, there was a growth in Internet and mobile connectivity penetration in the country, which served to highlight
the increasing significance of these assets for the national
community and the government.
The year 2012 was a landmark year for Internet policy development in the three governance dimensions, namely,
technical, institutional, and systemic; progress was made
in all three. As Costa Rica hosted the 43 ICANN meeting,
the issue achieved prominence in the national agenda.
The keynote speech, delivered by the then President Laura Chinchilla (2010-2014), was not merely a declaration of
goodwill. It posed a challenge to improve Internet development in general:
We aspire to become the network access point of
the digital economy in Central America and the Caribbean. However, we Costa Ricans are not satisfied with
a good worldwide connection. We want to feel connected among ourselves as best we can. Therefore, a
year ago I challenged my nation. Along with the social
covenant for peace and the social covenant for nature,
we should also subscribe a social digital covenant.27
This speech made a significant impact on policy both
domestically and abroad. Domestically, the project of developing an Internet exchange point, mentioned by President Chinchilla, began to take shape under the lead of
.cr.28 The second highlight of the year was the creation of
the Internet Consulting Council (CCI) in October. The CCI
attends to the institutional dimension of Internet governance, and while it does not aim for systemic governance
at the regime level, it has helped this small country achieve
global recognition through a specific positioning of Internet governance related matters.

27 The full transcript of the speech is available at: http://costarica43.icann.org/
meetings/sanjose2012/video-president-chinchilla-speech-12mar12-en
28 The first national IXP was finally inaugurated in June 2014, a few days before
President Chinchilla left office. The registry and the operators that joined the
initiative headed and co-financed the project.

The .cr registry as part of the National Academy of Sciences first convened the CCI to create an institutional
space for the discussion of pressing issues requiring the
perspectives of multiple stakeholders, such as the development of national broadband plans, a Universal Access
Fund (and the allocation of resources for it), and the first
IXP. Its formal objectives are to participate in policy recommendations for the TLD of Costa Rica and in the advancement of the Internet to contribute to national development objectives. Although the CCI is a multi-stakeholder
body, with representatives of government agencies, scientific and academic institutions, NGOs, and businesses, the
overwhelming majority of its members are government
and state entities.29 In this way, even though the multistakeholder principle underlies its core operational practices and values, the CCI has a strong public-sector orientation due to this presence.
While it does not produce formal documents, nor does
it generate multi-stakeholder statements as national positions, as is the case of the Brazilian CGI. The CCI is formally
constituted as a space for discussion of specific Internet issues and for the validation of technical governance initiatives lead by nic.cr, like the recent IXP launch.30 Its methodology comprises working groups addressing the following
issues: National Internet Policy, Internet Security, Educational Network, Cybercrime, Infrastructure, and Promotion of the .cr Domain Name.31 CCI members meet every
six months to discuss the progress made in the six working groups and other emerging issues. Their work is then
continued online through a closed platform for members,
where intersession assignments are followed. If there is a
need to treat a specific concern, extraordinary meetings
are convened.
NIC.cr conducted consultations with the Mexican and
Brazilian national Internet registries and the CGI in order
to identify best practices and experiences that would
help shape the CCI. “These agencies work in analogous
contexts to that of Costa Rica, with a similar idiosyncrasy,
since they are all Latin American and share common features. They also have had experience with this issue, in
particular, NIC.br and the CGI.”32 Following this round of
consultations, Costa Rica decided to implement a model
that incorporated aspects of both experiences. The institutional configuration of the CCI is more formal than that of
29 The full list of members is available at: https://consejoconsultivo.cr/miembros
30 The first IXP in Costa Rica was launched in June 2014.
31 “There was a group working on domain name disputes that was closed after
the life cycle of the topic (...) ended” (Rosalía Morales, Director, .cr, interview
conducted in July 2014).
32 Rosalía Morales, Director, .cr. Interview conducted in July 2014.
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the Mexican Initiative Group, which will be analyzed in the
next section. Nevertheless, it has less power to produce
policy recommendations and enforcement mechanisms
than the Brazilian CGI. Its role is that of an advisory council that promotes organized and documented discussions
and positions. Its recommendations are not binding with
regard to the policy-making process. They have been thematic instead of procedural, and have helped inform and
shape policy debates. Another difference with the Mexican experience is that CCI members are institutions rather
than individuals, a feature that is consistent with the greater presence of government stakeholders.
Although this space has not been defined as closed to
new members, since its creation the CCI has not invited
other actors to participate. According to SUTEL, the regulator, the group’s relatively informal mode of functioning
has created a harmonious environment; stronger formalization mechanisms would have generated conflicts and
tensions with those organizations that are currently not
part of it. The idea that it could potentially open up to new
members is important, since non-member stakeholders
could potentially question this body’s status and legitimacy. Due to its advisory and consulting nature and the
fact that its organizational boundaries are formally open,
particularly for technical topics, the CCI has been rarely
challenged.
Still, there are nuanced opinions regarding CCi’s scope
and goals, depending on the stakeholder group involved.
While government representatives consider the CCI an informal space for learning, sharing experiences, and receiving input for policymaking, for the conveners – the National Academy of Sciences, .cr, and the business sector – it is
an institutional sphere where governance processes take
place. These differing perceptions are also materialized in
the view of CCI members of the role of this organization
in systemic governance at the international level. When
the CCI was formed right before the WCIT conference, the
regulators33 did not feel compelled to discuss the country’s international position in this institutional setting, nor
to reach consensus regarding such position. They perceive
it as a workspace for policy-makers that facilitates well-informed, and hence improved, decision-making. According
to Mazón, at CCI meetings “it is important to understand
other points of view and to voice the regulator’s own.”34
At the same time, the convener of the meeting (.cr) views
it as a space whose objectives are in keeping with Internet development, working by way of an open, transparent
33 Adrián Mazón, SUTEL. Interview conducted in July 2014.
34 Adrián Mazón, SUTEL. Interview conducted in July 2014.
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mechanism, “expecting to maintain the principles of cooperation and trust.”35
A distinct feature of the Costa Rican case is the government’s commitment to the current model of global Internet governance as a bottom-up, open, and multi-stakeholder process. The Central American nation was among
the few Latin American countries36 that refused to sign
the new ITRs at WCIT. It saw this document as a threat to
the current model of Internet governance, a stance that
strengthened the position outlined by former President
Chinchilla in her closing words at the 2012 ICANN meeting
in San José:
Internet belongs to us all, and we should all participate in the discussion on the rules that should govern
the Internet. The design of Internet governance should
be based on a multi-stakeholder approach, regardless of our political, corporate, financial power. We
can participate in a process of reciprocal trust that will
reinforce coordination and organization mechanisms
in a democratic way. Internet is the great opportunity
that we have in history, so as to not repeat our past
errors that led to the creation of international governance institutions that are vertical, closed and bureaucratic.37
President Chinchilla’s speech became a roadmap for the
country’s position at the NETmundial meeting in Sao Paulo.38 Costa Rican authorities participated in the conference
along with most governments in the region. Yet the Central American nation’s status as an “ally” that was invited
to the ICANN–WEF NETmundial Initiative in August 2014
in Geneva39 evinces the unique regional and international
35 Rosalía Morales, Director, .cr. Interview conducted in July 2014.
36 Chile, Colombia, and Peru also adopted this position.
37 Available in http://costarica43.icann.org/meetings/sanjose2012/video-
president-chinchilla-speech-12mar12-en
38 As evidenced by the public announcement by the Ministry of Science,
Technology and Telecommunications during the NETmundial meeting.
Available at http://www.micit.go.cr/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=6184:costa-rica-reitera-su-posicion-a-favor-del-internet-libre-yabierto&catid=40&Itemid=630
39 The NETmundial Initiative is a process that was initiated by ICANN and the
WEF in August 2014 in a meeting in Geneva to address the current gaps and
challenges facing Internet governance ecosystem and to provide a platform
for discussion for the implementation of the issues raised by the NETmundial
Multi-stakeholder Statement, the outcome document of the NETmundial
conference of April 2014, Sao Paulo. The NETmundial Initiative has evolved
considerably since the meeting in Geneva and is currently becoming more
consolidated as a multi-stakeholder institutional platform where ICANN, WEF
and the CGI are the main promoters. It has not been exempt of criticism and
concern by representatives from all stakeholder groups since reasons for
the development of a new international multi-stakeholder platform remain
unclear to many in the context of an expectation of a renewal of the IGF
mandate by the UN Secretary General in 2015 and the intense work around
the IANA Stewardship Transition process.
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role it has adopted – that of a country that is playing by the
rules of the game of the international regime. It was the
only country in Latin America besides Brazil whose government was invited to participate in this meeting and will
be hosting a NETmundial Initiative meeting next March
2015.
The Costa Rican experience showcases an attempt to
formalize and produce concrete outcomes in the technical dimension of Internet governance through the CCI’s
various working groups output documents (.cr domain
report) and proposals (from the launch of the IXP in 2014
to the development of training modules on cybersecurity
issues to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). Regardless of
the non-binding nature of the council’s documents and
working group products, the government has attempted
to consolidate an institutionalized setting to discuss the
policy agenda. As a body, the CCI is not oriented toward
participation in systemic governance: its focus is on domestic policies. Nonetheless, some of its stakeholders,
notably the regulator (SUTEL) and the Ministry of Science
Technology and Telecommunications, together with the
.cr registry, are following and taking part in global initiatives. The involvement of the Ministry of Science and Technology in the NETmundial Initiative is a strong sign of support and alignment with a specific process emerging from
powerful organizations (ICANN, WEF and CGI) and for this
last reason, heavily questioned in recent months.
Mexico
In the early 1990s Mexico boasted a high-quality Internet
connectivity infrastructure and a burgeoning community,
with three different academic networks distributed across
major urban areas.40 These networks received government
funds, enabling them to consolidate infrastructure and expand theuser base. However, institutional rivalries and disagreements, as well as competition for government funding (Gayosso, 2003) also led to a duplication of efforts in
the management of critical Internet resources. There were
three DNS operations for the .mx Top Level Domain: one
was managed by ITESM and had been formally delegated
by Jon Postel’s IANA on February 1st, 1989; another was
managed by the UNAM network, and consisted of Type B
class of IP addresses; and the third was the National Technological Network. The Mexican ISOC Chapter worked
within UNAM, and there was a more or less tacit agreement to split technical and policy issues between the two
major national universities to avoid unnecessary friction
40 MEXNET comprised the ITESM in Monterrey and the University of Guadalajara;
the UNAM network was located in Mexico City; and RUTYC conjoined thirtyfive public universities spread throughout the country (but it only lasted a
year, from 1992 to 1993) (Huesca Morales, 1998).

(Gayosso, 2003). By 1995, with the increased popularity
of the Internet as an access to the World Wide Web and
the creation of the Mexican ISOC Chapter, it became indispensable to integrate these efforts. ITESM, which was
the country’s official ccTLD, became also the NIC and managed IP allocation services (NIC.MX).41
Mexico’s ccTLD has been a leading registry in the Latin
American region, not only because of its special status as
National Internet Registry,42 but also due to its in-house
technological and commercial innovation. Along with nic.
br, it has been a pioneering institution in the establishment of LACTLD in 1998 and the Regional Internet Registry, LACNIC, in 2002, and was deeply involved in the
creation of ICANN (1998) and the ccNSO (2004). After
the initial years of rivalry between ITESM and UNAM, the
registry managed to develop a strong domestic position,
guaranteeing stable and reliable services. Yet the early experience in coordinating critical Internet resources left a
valuable lesson to the community of Internet pioneers in
both universities. They had to work with the international
regime in order both to understand and play by its rules
and thus strengthen their position domestically, and to
disseminate the core values and principles derived from
Internet architecture within their communities. They also
realized that there was room to launch regional processes
that included the organizations mentioned above.
While the Internet technical community was making
progress in the development of new institutions, the telecommunications regulatory authorities lagged behind.
During the early 1990s the government started a process
of telecommunication reform aiming to create a “national
champion” within the sector. For this reason, it set in motion the privatization of Telmex (until then a public company) by granting an exclusive concession for seven years
in December 1990. One of the first goals of the privatized
Telmex was the development of a fiber optic network,
which would greatly enhance Internet connectivity during the first years of that decade, especially in comparison
with other countries in the region.
The main document that served to regulate the telecommunications sector during the first five years after privatization was the Concession Title (TC). The latter stated
that by way of the public telephone network grid, Telmex
should offer voice, sound, data, texts, and images, as well
as local and international calls. Telmex was also granted
41 http://www.nic.mx/es/NicMx.Historia
42 Both in Latin America and in Asia Pacific, National Internet Registries (NIRs)
were established before Regional Internet Registries. Brazil and Mexico are the
only two NIRs in LAC, and there are seven in AP.
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the provision of mobile telephony services, but with the
stipulation that such provision would be deregulated. Value-added services, which included the Internet, were also
to be offered in a context of market competitiveness. As
Mariscal puts it,
the reform of the (telecommunications) sector
posed obstacles from the beginning. These obstacles
gave rise to an essential feature of Mexican telecommunications, namely, its precarious institutions (…)
One of the constitutive aspects of the Mexican model is
that the structural component of its regulatory framework is a contract between the government and the
company Telmex instead of an overarching law for the
sector. (Mariscal, 2007: 265) 43
In 1996 the Federal Telecommunications Act (LFT)
was enacted that followed the line of limited competition, which enabled Telmex to grow into a global player.
Although the LFT had to stimulate competition among
telecommunications providers, there was no institutional
home for this function. The regulator, the Federal Telecommunications Commission (COFETEL), established by executive order in the same year, had also been institutionally
weak since its creation. In certain crucial matters, such as
producing standards and technical plans and awarding
broadcasting services through calls for bids, its role was
limited to submitting opinions to the Secretary of Communications and Transport (SCT), who was granted decision-making powers after the LFT was passed. The lack of
real autonomy and clear boundaries and the duplication
of roles generated a slow and inefficient regulatory process; no agency had the authority or flexibility of a decision-making body. Effectiveness and timeliness have been
absent from the Mexican telecommunications sector for
more than fifteen years.
The national regulatory framework remained more
or less the same until 2006, when a description of COFETEL’s functions was incorporated into the LFT. The regulator became a decentralized administrative body of the
SCT, but with full autonomy to dictate resolutions. While
value-added services (which is the formal legal figure that
frames the commercial provision of Internet services), and
later VOIP, were offered within a competitive market, the
long and costly bureaucratic procedures imposed on new
providers44 meant that in practice, Telmex’s dominant
43 Authors’ translation.
44 As an example, a special concession was necessary to provide VOIP services, a
provision that acted as a barrier to effective competition in this area.
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position helped the company extend its reach to all communication matters in a sector that follows a convergence
model. As a consequence, Internet service provision depended increasingly on this company.
The long-sought reform of the telecommunications sector came about during the administration of Enrique Peña
Nieto in 2012,45 in a process that crystallized on July 14,
2014 and was called the LFT Amendment. The new Federal
Telecommunications Act created the Federal Institute of
Telecommunications (IFT), phased out COFETEL, and empowered the Secretary of Communications and Transport
to implement Internet policy. Reforms have shaken up
the entire telecom and media sectors, and their long-term
consequences could be very significant for all communication policies in the country. As we describe in the next
subsection, these regulatory reforms have sought an institutional balance whereby state policy begins to address
the Internet more specifically.
President Peña Nieto’s reform of the national telecommunications sector started in 2012 with the creation of the
agency National Digital Strategy. The aim of this office is to
coordinate all the Executive’s efforts associated with the
Internet (including governance issues) and digital communications. Until its creation, the various Internet stakeholders mentioned above, such as NIC.MX, the Mexican ISOC
Chapter, or AMIPCI (the Mexican Internet Association),46
as well as other civil society organizations and companies
formed a loosely bound group that would join forces to
challenge regulatory measures that threatened the Internet’s architectural principles, its established organizations,
and human rights issues, among others. Yet these were
informal mechanisms based on social ties that had been
forged over the years.47 There was a lingering idea to develop a multi-stakeholder space where participants would
be on equal footing to promote informed dialogues and
debates around Internet issues.
The creation of the National Digital Strategy within the
President’s Office sparked the emergence of the Initiative
Group. According to the President’s Office, “the National
Digital Strategy became a catalyst for this initiative, since it
prioritized the issue in the national agenda and placed Internet governance at the center of the government’s digital policy.”48 The Initiative Group had neither an official nor
45 Member of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), which governed Mexico
during most of the 20th century.
46 AMIPCI was created in 1999 and is a leading organization of the Mexican
Internet business community.
47 Haces, policy advisor, NIC.MX. Interview conducted in 2014.
48 Gutiérrez, Office of the President. Interview conducted in 2014.
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a legal structure. It started early in 2013 under the guise of
informal talks among representatives of different sectors.
Initially, NIC.MX, in its role as convener, contacted two representatives per sector. This was a personal, unofficial, and
non-binding invitation. The group gradually consolidated
into a multi-stakeholder organization comprising five sectors, namely, academia, civil society, the technological
community, operators, and government. It adopted the
following principles referred to organizational aspects:
equitable participation, balanced representation, self-motivated rather than formal leadership based on the topic
under discussion, and consensus-based decisions (Haces,
interview, 2014).
In 2013 the group agreed to produce a formal output,
and decided to organize a meeting aimed at expressing
the fluid, interactive nature of its institutional setting. For
this reason, it opted to call this meeting a dialogue rather
than a forum or seminar. Entitled Dialogues on Internet
Governance, the two-day event was held in November
2013. It could be characterized as a national IGF, and was
the first of its kind in the country. The group developed
the program with input from surveys administered to
the Mexican Internet community, reflecting an array of
concerns regarding human rights, ecommerce and participation. It was a highly attended event and was broadcast nationwide.49 It was viewed as a success, and it was
the first time a multi-stakeholder initiative had produced
such a specific outcome (Martínez, interview, July 2014).
A second edition of the Mexican Dialogues has recently
been organized exposing the need to continue with a new
space for interaction.50
The Initiative Group has maintained online activity by
way of a mailing list created for this purpose.51 Its members have realized that this list is a living, useful tool and
point of contact to discuss current issues, such as the IANA
stewardship transition and NETmundial (Haces, interview,
2014). In the latter case, the group has reached an agreement concerning the Mexican position for this meeting
and the NETmundial Multi-Stakeholder Statement (Haces,
interview, July 2014). The agency has not followed other
examples in the LAC region. Instead, it has embraced the
founding principles espoused by organizations that have
traditionally belonged to the Internet technical communi49 More than 3,000 devices logged into the remote participation platform: http://
media.wix.com/ugd/802958_1e0ec112f1db43749f6bfe441aa28e58.pdf
50 The second edition was organized on 17-18 February 2015.
51 It used the mailing list address grupodeinciativa@nic.mx, an address that
shows the engagement of the NIC.MX with the initiative.

ty (IETF, ICANN) in its choice of consent-based discussions,
openness, and equality, and the Tunis Agenda in its adoption of a rights-based approach to the topics discussed.52
The Initiative Group faces the challenge of maintaining
the continuity of the events it organizes, and promoting
renewal and growth with the incorporation of new members while preserving its informal nature. Both this body,
as a plural space for national debate and coordination and,
in particular, the National Digital Strategy agency will be in
the spotlight in 2016, as the Mexican government submitted a formal request to the United Nations to host the 11th
IGF (provided the IGF’s mandate is renewed). In addition,
Mexico will also host the eLAC ministerial meeting and the
8th “LAC IGF.” These regional and global events represent
challenges and opportunities for domestic stakeholders,
and there is a strong, unanimous feeling that the initial
steps toward national coordination have helped pave the
way for a greater degree of institutional governance. 2015
and 2016 will be crucial to assess the ability of the Group
Initiative’s multi-stakeholder model to deal with, both procedurally and substantially, the challenges of Internet governance in its institutional and systemic dimensions.
An important feature of Mexican Internet policy is related with the country’s physical and economic connectedness to the U.S., which has resulted in an affinity for shared
Internet policies (including net neutrality and ISP liability),
which has also been shaped by economic treaties such as
the experience of the TPP (Martínez, interview, July 2014).
However, at the same time, along with regional partners,
the country has sought to define a block of Latin American interests with regard to international forums such as
WCIT (2012), the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in Busan
in 2014, and the forthcoming Ministerial eLAC Conference.
In addition, the presence of the Mexican technical Internet community and government in leading positions at
ICANN53 has generated a natural dialogue between these
stakeholders and one of the major institutions of the international regime. This dialogue is an important asset that
connects the national and international levels. Their close
contact with ICANN experts has helped Mexican stakeholders acquire the knowledge required to operate in the
systemic governance dimension, a knowledge that is often implicit due to its political nature.
52 A detailed description of these principles is available at http://www.gobernanzadeinternet.mx/#!acerca/c4nz.
53 There are a handful of examples of Mexican technical experts and academics serving on the ICANN board and participating in other technical entities.
Notably, the two ICANN regional representatives have been former COFETEL
staff. This representation is much larger than that of any other country in the
LAC region.

Page 17

INTERNET POLICY FORMATION IN LATIN AMERICA: UNDERSTANDING THE LINKS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL, THE REGIONAL, AND THE GLOBAL

4. Comparative Analysis and Discussion
This section provides a comparative analysis of the three
national contexts in order to identify common patterns
and key points of divergence. In particular, we compare
the following dimensions: a) the institutional building
blocks of national governance initiatives; b) stakeholder
representation in these bodies/debates; c) isomorphism
with, or replication of, the experience of other countries,
especially the Brazilian multi-stakeholder model; d) articulation with global Internet policy discussions and institutions; and e) policy coordination mechanisms within the
region.
Regarding the scope and goals of the new national initiatives, there is considerable variation in the cases analysed. Unlike Brazil, which created the CGI in 1995, the three
countries studied here present very recent institutional
configurations, established during the 2012-2014 period.
They may thus cement in the medium term, but at present
their institutional foundations are still weak.
For example, Argentina’s CAPI was established in April
2014 through an administrative order by the telecommunications regulator. Up to that time, Argentina’s international representation in global Internet forums was incumbent upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, except in the
case of multilateral processes such as CITEL and the ITU.
Yet, after NETmundial several Internet policy issues were
considered interrelated despite their being addressed by
different government agencies. The need arose for a formal coordination at the domestic level that would lead to
a more effective engagement in the international sphere.
While it might be too soon to assess its effectiveness, the
agency has held few meetings and has not developed a
voice of its own in recent domestic debates - for example,
on net neutrality and the new bill “Argentina Digital.” Internationally, there has been an increased representation
of the communications regulator in forums such as the IGF
and ICANN, which had been traditionally assigned to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but to what extent this is a consequence of improved domestic institutional governance
or of internal power struggles is yet unclear. What does
transpire from the creation and evolution of CAPI is that
it is a weak institutional mechanism highly dependent on
the Secretary of Communications, which has discretionary
power to convene it and utilize it to build consensus within the government or with a broader set of stakeholders.
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In the case of Costa Rica, the CCI emerged as a response
to the need for a more organized forum for debate, and
was intended to achieve technological and policy improvement in view of the prominence of Internet issues
in President Chinchilla’s agenda. ICANN 43, held in San
Jose in 2012, rendered this agenda more visible to both
domestic and international audiences. Like that of CAPI,
the creation of the CCI was triggered in part by an international event, but the presidential agenda had traced a
more clearly defined roadmap. So had the Social, Digital,
and Environmental Covenant of Costa Rica (2010), which
was based on a multi-stakeholder alliance geared toward
increasing connectivity in order to support the enhancement of productivity and the development of the digital
economy in the country. Since the CCI is a multi-stakeholder body convened by a scientific consortium, its scope and
goals are less formal than those of CAPI, despite the fact
that many government bodies participate in it.
The Mexican Initiative Group’s aims are similar to the
CCI’s; it seeks to provide a consolidated space for debate
and information sharing, and to organize the Mexican
Dialogues on Internet Governance. Its nature, like that of
the Costa Rican body, is mostly informational. What distinguishes it is that it resulted from a redefinition of national
policy and regulatory authorities (in particular, from the
creation of the presidential coordinating agency for the
National Digital Strategy) rather than from a single international event. In addition, the Initiative Group is the least
formal in terms of standard definitions of norms and regulations, not because it failed to achieve a more organic
structure but because informality was a desired outcome.
This space emulates many of the early working methods
and values of the original Internet technical communities,
as well as the principles defined by the Tunis Agenda. The
process dimension of governance is very much a key component of this multi-stakeholder entity, and the appropriateness and efficacy of this arrangement will be put to a
test when Mexico becomes the host for regional and international Internet governance events. Both the CCI and the
Group Initiative are oriented toward consolidating institutional governance processes within the domestic realm.
Stakeholder participation in all three instances differs in
terms of composition and number, and in the roles played
by each stakeholder group. CAPI is a purely governmental entity convened by SECOM. The CCI and the Initiative
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Group are plural, but the latter shows a more balanced
representation than the former.54 The Group Initiative
has twelve members, roughly two from each stakeholder
group, although the technical community (NIC.MX, ISOC,
ICANN) is dominant. In the CCI, by contrast, there is a
greater number of government representatives.

es that were already taking place but had no concrete
outcomes for the wider national community of Internet
stakeholders. Consequently, it implemented some tools
to facilitate the development of an ongoing debate in a
trustworthy environment with a closed mailing list, and
produced the first experience of a “Mexican IGF.”

A key feature for the analysis of stakeholder participation is how formally these initiatives have defined membership eligibility and/or renewal, and their degree of
openness. Although CAPI is an intra-governmental body,
it has acknowledged the need for multi-stakeholder feedback from the community. Furthermore, during the only
meeting with other actors that has been held to date,55
participants mentioned the plural composition of the Brazilian CGI as a desirable future. Yet the implementation of
such a model, which requires the selection of representatives from each stakeholder group, has been a barrier
to running this type of institution effectively. The CCI, in
turn, has no clear membership rules and has been working
with the same composition for over two years. Although,
in practice the agency is open to new representatives
and some of its members have manifested that it would
be desirable to incorporate them, their integration might
generate greater competition and rivalry among the organizations that are left out. Finally, a distinctive trait of the
Group Initiative is that its members were invited to join in
their individual capacity. While the invitations preserved a
balanced representation, members were carefully chosen
based on personal rather than institutional qualities.

It is worth bearing in mind that the plurality of Brazil’s
CGI was wrought over the course of eight years. While the
agency emerged as a multi-stakeholder body in 1995, it
evolved into its current configuration thanks to a reform
mandated by an executive order issued by Luiz Ignacio
Lula da Silva in 2003. The original CGI had a variety of representatives, but the government selected/endorsed the
members from other sectors. In the second and current
phase of the committee, each stakeholder group elects its
own representatives, and while the government has the
largest number, it does not have a majority. The formalization of such a body implied a greater degree of institutionalization over time regarding regulatory and normative
aspects (Scott, 1995).

Stakeholder representation is also at the core of the
goals and scope of these new institutional building blocks.
In the case of Argentina, however, intra-governmental
coordination was prioritized. Stakeholder representation,
therefore, is not as relevant as it is in the other two cases.
While the Costa Rican CCI is more organic (with working
groups that will help inform and shape policy-making, a
fixed meeting calendar, and a special online platform to
carry out intersession work), multi-stakeholder dialogue is
an essential component that will contribute to formulating well-informed national policies.56 The Initiative Group
in Mexico needed to formalize discussions and exchang54 Many international settings formally accept this principle as suitable for
Internet governance. It is the case of the IGF’s MAG, the UN Working Group on
Enhanced Cooperation for Internet Governance, and the NETmundial organizing committee, among others.
55 This meeting took place on May 26, 2014.
56 It is also essential to bear in mind that a small-sized country such as Costa Rica
faces different challenges and needs a different approach to stakeholder coordination; the distinction between formal and informal, and even stakeholder
affiliation, might sometimes blur in smaller economies/contexts. A representative of the Uruguayan government offered a similar portrayal when referring
to plural platforms in that country.

The procedure for admission into the CGI constitutes a
device that promotes organized collective action (Olson,
1971), although it should be stressed that it might not
prove successful or legitimate in other national contexts.
Nonetheless, public good provision comes at the cost of
improving collective action mechanisms, so multi-stakeholder representation in these national bodies will need to
address the challenges posed by self-interest and capture.
A greater degree of focus on, and strengthening of, the
institutional dimension of governance may be indispensable for their survival.
The cases studied also vary in their degree of isomorphism with the global Internet governance regime. Argentina’s regulatory and institutional building blocks (the new
law “Argentina digital” and CAPI) constitute the strategy
that least responds to global principles of Internet policy
and governance. Argentina’s CAPI is based on hierarchical
governance (Peters, 2010), with a focus on governmental
capacity regarding Internet control, knowledge, and operations through its critical resources. This initiative has
greater isomorphism with multilateral organizations, such
as the ITU and UN processes, rather than with the open,
multi-stakeholder bodies of the international Internet regime configured in the past two decades.
Nevertheless, CAPI is also a clear sign of governmental
recognition of the complex nature of the Internet and of
the need for greater participation in other institutional
settings. Beyond the activity of this agency, the ArgenPage 19
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tine government has been a leading force in the regional
processes launched by multilateral organizations such as
ECLAC and CITEL, but also in other, more plural spaces like
the regional IGF (LACIGF) and IGF MAG. In addition, the
Internet providers’ association CABASE espouses the values of the technical and business sectors and maintains an
ongoing presence in regional multi-stakeholder initiatives.
Consequently, despite the fact that national Internet processes are not organic or coordinated at all levels, some
policies, especially those linked to technical governance,
are in line with the global regime.
As for Costa Rica’s CCI, its scope, working methods, and
composition follow the principles of multi-stakeholder
governance – emphasis on working group discussions is
one of the latter’s key features (Hemmati, 2002). In addition, the government has repeatedly endorsed the international regime’s principles and values, and Western democracies consider it a strategic player since its opposition
to WCIT in 2012 and its high profile in the 2014 NETmundial Initiative in Geneva.
The Mexican Initiative Group, in turn, is strongly articulated with the values emanating from WSIS, the Tunis
Agenda, and the Internet technical community’s historical
modus operandi. Nevertheless, this body and the Mexican
Dialogues on Internet Governance need to inform policymakers better, especially with regard to critical Internet
resources and the “jurisdictional” turn given to many of
these resources in the last two ITU Plenipotentiary Conferences.57 In the regional preparatory meetings for the
Plenipotentiary, the Mexican and Argentine delegations
produced documents on the matter that sometimes evidenced a lack of understanding of the technical architectural features and other times were based on mistrust of
the private sector or of multi-stakeholder arrangements. 58
At the same time, the Mexican government has been
an active participant and leader in many regional multilateral (eLAC and CITEL) and multi-stakeholder initiatives
(LACIGF). The scope and objectives of the new autonomous regulatory authority, the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT), the National Digital Strategy (whereby
access to ICTs is a right guaranteed by the State),59 and the
57 These are the so called “Internet-related public policy issues.” The last Plenipotentiary meeting (Busan, October-November 2014) included the following
resolutions touching upon several of these issues: 2, 101, 102, 133, 178, 180,
ITR Resolution 3 and the Role of the ITU, and ITU PP-10 Decision 11. Based on
ITU Plenipotentiary 2014 – Outcomes Matrix as of 10 November 2014 (ISOC,
2014).
58 The literature regarding participation of developing country governments
and their preference for multilateral arrangements (MacLean et al, 2007; Drake
and Wilson, 2008) has pointed to this aspect of the documents.
59 Article 6 of the Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico is concerned with Telecommunications and Economic Competition.
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open, non-discriminatory, and neutral features of the Internet established by law (LFT, 2014, Articles 145 and 146)
could be interpreted as legal and institutional actions that
bridge the distance between the international and domestic spheres in terms of trends and best practices (MacLean
et al, 2007; Correa et al, 2006). In addition, Mexico’s hosting relevant regional and international Internet meetings
in 2015 and 2016 is another opportunity to create new interfaces between these spheres.
Concerning the degree of coordination between these
initiatives and regional processes (which were described
in the first section), the latter have historically preceded
domestic configurations, save in the case of Brazil. It is interesting to note that all stakeholders embarked on a consolidation of the regional mechanisms before the domestic
sphere crystallized around specific institutional formations
such as the ones examined here. Therefore, despite the
fact that national Internet stakeholders from the technical,
scientific, and government communities emerged over
two decades ago along with the first Internet connections,
the national processes have taken much longer to institutionalize domestically than the regional processes.
One possible explanation for this lag is the quick and
successful consolidation of the transnational Internet governance regime (Drake and Wilson, 2008; Lucero, 2011),
which rapidly promoted the development of regional
processes as a subsidiary level for discussion and implementation of global Internet policy. In the LAC region,
the series of regional government meetings held as part
of the preparations of the WSIS process (Bavaro 2003, Rio
de Janeiro 2004), LAC IGF (which started in 2008 and was
organized initially by LACNIC representatives, RITS, and
APC) are examples of the interrelatedness of the consolidation of regional and transnational structures. Yet their
taking longer to develop does not necessarily make national mechanisms weaker. On the contrary, particularly in
the case of the Costa Rican CCI and the Mexican Initiative
Group, concentrating on the national agenda leads them
to carry out their work with a greater degree of autonomy
to address their concerns.
The following figure presents a mapping of the case
studies analysed along two key variables. The first (on the
vertical axis) is the degree of formalization of the initiative;
in other words, to what extent is the initiative formalized
in terms of representation, decision-making process and
scope of issues. This variable also reflects how the initiative
has emerged, ie whether it was created by administrative
order or emerged from the bottom-up led by its participants. The second variable (on the horizontal axis) repre-
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sents the degree to which policymaking is dominated by
state actors. Put differently, it indicates to what extent the
policymaking process involves non-state actors, ie, is a
multi-stakeholder process.
This conceptual matrix of policy-making mechanisms
reveals three distinct configurations that have characterized Internet governance since the 1980s. The first is the
Consensus model, which is best illustrated by the IETF and
the development of Internet standards in the 1980s. At a
time when the Internet community was small and relatively homogeneous, the RFC model of “rough consensus and
running code” was an effective mechanism for reaching
agreement on the basic architectural pillars of this emerging technology. The recent Mexican initiative on Internet
governance owes much to this model: it is by and large
a non-formal consensus-building mechanism where state
actors work alongside multiple other stakeholders.

As the Internet became more complex in its structure
and geographical scope in the 1990s, a new policymaking
model begin to coalesce around ICANN and other focal institutions such as WSIS and later the IGF. While this phase
retained the multi-stakeholder principles that characterized the first phase, the mechanisms were increasingly
formalized and national governments began to demand a
larger role in the policymaking process. We call this period
the U.S. Multi-stakeholder phase, given the prominent role
played by the U.S. government with respect to ICANN’s attributions. Even if the attempts of ICANN in its origins were
to become a global multi-stakeholder organization, it was
still too heavily linked to its origins reflecting the Clinton
administration and the interests of companies in the country (Mueller, 2002). This is also the model for Brazil’s CGI
and Costa Rica’s CCI initiative: a formal, state-sanctioned
mechanism for policymaking in which state actors are
well represented, but where non state actors are also rep-

Figure 1: Policymaking mechanisms for Internet governance
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resented to varying degrees (e.g., more so in the case of
Brazil than in the case of Costa Rica).
The third phase, which we label a Global Mixed Regime,
is characterized by the increasing pressure by state actors
from the developing world for a systemic shift in the policymaking process to include more existing multilateral
mechanisms, such as those of the ITU and the UN system,
or regional organizations such as OAS into several of the
issues concerning Internet-governance, particularly those
that could be labelled as pertaining to the “public policy”
domain. As this work has revealed for the Latin American region, this does not mean that there is a rejection of
multi-stakeholder ventures, such as that of ICANN with its
strong U.S. centric dominance, but it shows that regional
actors are becoming more active promoters in the selection and combination of institutional mechanisms that
they perceive are more suitable (both politically and instrumentally) to their purposes. At the national level, this
is exemplified by Argentina’s CAPI, which since its first year
of creation represents a policy-coordination mechanism
for government agencies in which non state actors have
minimal to no participation, but which seeks to engage in
a more coordinated manner with the international regime,
one of the key gaps which governments traditionally face
vis-à-vis these new global processes. The fact that this is
not a multi-stakeholder body on its own does not imply
that this initiative is contrary to the multi-stakeholder governance model of the Internet. However, its lack of openness to participation from other stakeholders shapes its
institutional configuration as well as the the scope of its
agenda and mission.

Page 22

AGUERRE, C., AND GALPERIN, H.

5. Conclusions
This paper examines national Internet governance
mechanisms in the early stages of the institutionalization process; it looks at the main developments that
have shaped both actors’ strategies and the evolution
of Internet regulations in these countries. These domestic developments, aiming to shape and coordinate positions around Internet governance, reflect the maturity of
national stakeholders on this matter, a maturity that will
allow them to refine specific Internet-related policy issues
and processes. Since the Internet has carved a space of its
own in the international regime, it is expected that a similar approach will be increasingly adopted in the national
arena. The bridges between the international and the domestic field will tend to rely on more formally institutionalized spaces as the state becomes a stronger player in these
issues with its national bureaucracies.
The social capital of the early Internet engineers in these
domestic spaces led to initial governance arrangements
based on technical knowledge (Peters, 2010) – especially
in the case of Costa Rica and Mexico. In other cases, such
as Argentina there was a combination of hierarchical
(state) control and knowledge governance. In each case,
it is clear that governments are now working to formalize policymaking arrangements as the nascent informal
coordination mechanisms are no longer sufficient in the
current context. National policies need to address increasingly sensitive issues such as privacy, cyber security, surveillance, and net neutrality, together with a deployment
of improved connectivity infrastructure.
Institutional governance plays an essential role in the
construction of a national space for Internet policy-making
in the countries analysed here, in that it articulates the expertise of the early Internet pioneers and the policymakers’ agenda and their use of traditional mechanisms of regulation and normative control. These national initiatives
must necessarily include policy-makers in systemic governance if regime changes are sought. Nonetheless, as we
have described above, even those governments that have
shown more ambivalence toward some of the features of
the current international regime of Internet governance,
like those of Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil (with its historical opposition to the unilateral control of the NTIA over
the IANA functions), are working within the institutional
boundaries of the global Internet governance regime.

Although the work addresses specific national cases
and regional generalizations should be avoided without
further analysis, there are some emerging trends that can
be addressed from a comparative perspective in order to
characterize regional choices. While the defining features
of U.S. international Internet policy has been based in the
sustained support of the founding engineering organizations that developed the core protocols, including the
ICANN model for the DNS – a model that has been based
in the first two phases of our figure, other regions have followed different combinations, considering the national
interest of predominant states and blocks. The trajectory
of Europe, organized around a strong regional body that
has privileged the application of rights and obligations for
different policy-areas has shown their own preferences for
several Internet policy concerns, where the multi-stakeholder model of governance pre-exists arrangements
around the Internet. The European bloc has served as a
natural ally of the U.S. multi-stakeholder phase – even if
critical of many of the arrangements surrounding Internet governance processes in bodies such as ICANN. The
regions and countries that do not have a democratic tradition face extreme challenges in acknowledging many of
the private sector, multi-stakeholder processes of the Internet governance regime, since it defies some of the basic
domestic political economy division of social forces, and is
seen to undermine the long tradition of inter-governmental organizations that address global issues.
The arguments used to define Latin American Internet
governance approaches during WCIT-12 are closer to that
of a region which is in the stage of developing its preferences without a clear alignment to pre-defined models,
either from the U.S., Europe or the “bloc” including the
Arab States, Russia and China. The lack of formal regional policy-making mechanisms in Latin America, such as
those of the European Union, or the Arab League, provide
a more fertile background for domestic for policy definitions and as the work has intended to portray, these choices are currently varied. While WCIT analysts have relied on
definitions of “swing states” (Maurer and Morgus, 2014)
to define those countries that did not show a clear preference for the current arrangements in multi-stakeholder
Internet governance, we hope that this work has served
to point out that it proves to be insufficient to characterize this region’s orientations towards Internet policy and
governance arrangements with its diverse and rich tra-
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dition which has both embraced multi-stakeholder and
multilateral principles. These orientations derive from a
combined approach of relatively early development of the
Internet infrastructure and applications layers (when compared with other regions), with close ties with the global
Internet pioneers in developed countries, and on the other
with a tradition of international multilateral mechanisms.
In addition, the tradition of civic engagement in public
life in Latin America, particularly with the democratic shift
during the 1980s has balanced the predominance of one
single stakeholder, principally those of governments and
has promoted an increased diversity of players and forces
in the political economy of these countries, which has effects on both national and international approaches to Internet policy and governance.
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Acronyms
CAPI		
CCI		
CGI.br		
ccTLD		
CITEL 		
DNS 		
GAC 		
IANA 		
ICANN 		
IETF 		
ISOC 		
ITU 		
LAC 		
LFT 		
TCP/IP		
TLD 		
NIC 		
NTIA 		
OAS 		
RFC		
SECOM
UN 		
WCIT 		
WSIS 		

Comisión Argentina de Políticas de Internet (Argentine Commission for Internet Policy).
Consejo Consultivo de Internet (Internet Consulting Committee)
Comitê Gestor de Internet do Brasil (Internet Steering Commitee of Brazil)
country code Top Level Domain
Comisión Interamericana de Telecomunicaciones
Domain Name System
Government Advisory Committee
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
Internet Engineering Task Force
Internet Society
International Telecommunication Union
Latin America & Caribbean
Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
Top-Level Domain
Network Information Center
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
Organization of American States
Request for Comments
Secretaría de Comunicaciones
United Nations
World Conference on International Telecommunications
World Summit on the Information Society
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